



INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS OF TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY:
FROM FEDERALISM TO POWER-SHARING
Abstract. Thesis deals with the problem of different types of institutional
arrangements of territorial organization which are adopted worldwide.
Peculiarities of every type of institutional mechanism are discussed.
When we try to discuss diversity of states institutional organization
we can see, firstly, various forms of territorial autonomy, and
secondly, «shared rule» at the central government level [1]. Most
countries adopted hybrid institutions, which combine aspects of
various models, in order to be more flexible and effective. There are
four basic categories of institutional arrangements [2]: federalism,
autonomy, decentralization and power-sharing.
Federalism is dealing with the constitutional diffusion of power
(territorial sharing of power). According to N.Bermeo, federal system
exists where there is a layer of state institutions between a state’s
center and its localities, this layer of institutions features its own
leaders and elected bodies, and when those leaders and bodies share
decision-making power with the center [3]. To be federal for a state it
needs to guarantee in its constitution that both levels of government
have at least one area of action in which they have exclusive
jurisdiction. Federalism, then, is a constitutional means to prevent the
centralization of power [4]. Examples of federal system are not only
U.S., Canada, Russia, Germany, but also Macedonia, Bosnia, Sudan.
In case of territory and cultural aspects we can highlight four basic
types of federalism models:
1) Symmetric federalism — refers to a federal system of
government in which each constituent state to the federation possess
equal powers. Best example of such kind of model can be USA
because each state in country has the same constitutional
competences.
2) Asymmetric federalism — asymmetric federal model may
emerge when a unitary state develops a federal relationship with a
territorially, ethnically, or culturally distinct community, while the
rest of the country remains under unitary rule [2]. Good examples of
this kind of model are India with special provisions for some states;
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Denmark with specific relationship with Greenland; Canada with
Quebec which has distinct powers not granted to other provinces.
3) Mono-national federalism — refers to the countries which can
be ethnically homogenous (like Austria, Germany) but also to the
heterogeneous if their member states are not ethno-regional units, and
their population is integrated by a common political and national
consciousness and the unified identity of the population (like U.S.,
Australia). In these countries federalism is only linked to the national
question in a historical sense as it used to be a tool to unify the state
and build the nation [5].
4) Ethno-federalism — a state is ethno-federal when at least one of
its sub-units is intentionally associated with a specific ethnic or
linguistic category [6]. Today Spain, Canada and Belgium fall under
this category, but some decades ago former Soviet Union,
Czecoslovakia and Yugoslavia were examples of ethno-federal states.
This type of federalism can be divided into three categories:
- multiethnic federalism — refers to those ethno-federal countries
where the population is united by state-patriotism and a unified
identity of the population and where the demographic composition is
characterized by the predominance of the majority nation. A typical
example can be Switzerland, where everybody defines themselves as
Swiss first, and only belongs to one or other ethnic group or canton
with a secondary group identity [5];
- multinational federalism — refers to the countries where individual
ethnic groups had or have a separate national identity (Soviet case);
- borderline case between multiethnic and multinational types —
ethno-federations where integrative national political consciousness
and a strong separate identity are present at the same time (most
African and Asian ethno-federations belong to this category). In
Europe as good example of this case can be Flemish people in
Belgium, Catalonian people in Spain and the French in Quebec
(Canada). In Africa the population of Nigeria, for example, can be
divided into separate Ibo, Yoruba and Hausa nations, or along
religious lines between Muslims and Christians.
In case of finance distribution / redistribution we can highlight
other main types of federalism [7]:
1) Dual (layer cake) federalism — refers to a system in which the two
levels of government operate separately, and is pretty much the bog-
standard definition of how the framers intended it to be interpreted.
2) Cooperative (marble cake) federalism — implies that the federal
and state governments share power equally in order to resolve
common problems collectively.
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3) Creative (picket fence) federalism — allows the federal
government to decide what the states need, and then provide them
with the resources.
4) New federalism — included a reassertion of powers going back
to the state and local governments in order to create a new balance
between the two.
5) Progressive (competitive) federalism — provides states with
greater control over issues previously reserved for the federal
government, such as environmental and consumer protection.
But in real life all models of federalism are very connected and
American system of relations between the states and centre evolved
from dual through creative to competitive federalism (tab.1). Never
the less, all stages of fiscal federalism can be reduced to three models
that differ in the configuration of the distribution of powers between
the centre and sub-national governments (fig.1).
Table 1




Clear division of responsibilities between
central and sub-national governments,
capital and regions are considered as equal







Cooperation between national and sub-
national governments, dependency of
locals form the center’s decisions, centre






Increasing of central government’s role,
which through intergovernmental transfers
solves not only national but also sub-
national problems
1960—1980
4. New federalism Narrowing of central government’s role,
cuts spending of solving sub-national
problems, strengthening the regional





Freedom of decision-making by centre and
sub-national governments based on the tax
and budget autonomy, local governments
sell to citizens of region public goods in
return for the taxes that are kind of price
Since ХХІ
Sourse: [7; 8; 9]
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Autonomy arrangements devolve to minority groups the power to
exercise direct control over agreed upon issues of special concern to
them and allow the central state to exercise power over other policies
of concern to the whole state. Territorial autonomy is possible when
the minority is concentrated in one region of the country and when it
constitutes a majority in that region [1]. The main peculiarities of
territorial autonomy include: 1) minority language is the official
language of the region; 2) right to tax; 3) right to establish regional
institutions charged with legislative and executive functions; 4)
primary and sometimes secondary education on responsibility of
regional governments.
As an example of territorial autonomy can be Swedish-speaking
region of Åland in Finland, which has its own legislative and
executive bodies. Other examples of regional autonomy include the
Atlantic Coast of Nicaragua which was established for the protection
of indigenous people, the Chittagong Hill Tracts in Bangladesh, The
Cordillera Region (Philippines), Western Balochistan (Iran),
Transylvania (Romania), Transnistria (Moldova), South Ossetia
(Georgia), Turkish Kurdistan, et. [1; 2; 10]. There is strong difference
between autonomy and federalism: autonomy is a special arrangement
between the centre and one or two regions, as for example South
Tyrol in Italy, which does not include institutions through which
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Figure 1. Models of fiscal federalism
As K.Papagianni mentioned, territorial autonomy, rather than
federalism, is adopted when the primary goal is to address the local
concerns of territorially concentrated minorities [2]. Because
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territorial autonomy does not institutionalize regional power
at the centre, it may be easier to negotiate and adopt than
federalism as it meets less resistance from other regions of the
country. Many scholars [2; 11; 12] agreed that federalism and
territorial autonomy contribute positively to the sustainability of
peace, especially when combined with international military and
financial assistance.
Decentralization means that legislative and policy powers remain
with the centre, while implementation is delegated to either national
civil servants located in the regions or to locally established councils.
The essential and defining characteristic of decentralized power is that
it can be revoked by the centre [2]. Decentralization very often is a
compromise solution between the demands of minorities for territorial
autonomy and the unwillingness of the central state to grant it.
Decentralized governance has many advantages: 1) for democratic
participation, representation, and accountability; 2) for public policy
and governmental effectiveness; 3) for the representation and
accommodation of territorially based ethnic, cultural, and linguistic
differences [13; 14].
Like in case of federalism, there are some forms of
decentralization [15]:
1) Administrative decentralization transfers bureaucratic decision-
making authority and managerial responsibilities for the delivery and
regulation of public services and for raising revenues from the central
government to sub-national tiers.
2) Fiscal decentralization transfers some forms of resource
allocation, usually by giving subnational units authority over local
taxes and spending. Fiscal decentralization is believed [16] to reduce
corruption by strengthening the transparency of decision-making and
the accountability of elected officials to local communities. For
example, the Baltic States, Slovenia, Nordic countries are highly
decentralized. A significant part of tax revenues from local economic
activity goes to local budget and local administrations enjoy high
degree of autonomy. Taxes received by local governments as % of
total taxation in Estonia, Slovenia and Lithuania is around 12 %,
Latvia — 18 %, Finland — 22 %, Sweden — 35 % [17].
3) Political decentralization transfers authority and responsibility
from the central government to public bodies at sub-national level,
such as village assemblies, city mayors and state governors, and
elected municipal councils.
Power-sharing refers to political arrangements which guarantee the
participation of representatives of all significant communal groups in
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political decision-making and especially in the executive [18]. The
central idea of power-sharing is the inclusion and protection of
minorities groups from the outcome of majority rule. It exists through
proportional representation of all minorities in cabinets and
proportional allocations of funds and positions [2]. According to J.
Nye and R. Keohane [19], power-sharing arrangements can be
demonstrated in a scheme’s form (tab. 2).
Table 2
MODEL OF VERTICAL POWER-SHARING ARRANGEMENTS













































Power-sharing may be part of a larger deal which includes a
federal arrangement or provisions for territorial autonomy, or it can
exist in a unitary state [20]. This works well when political elites are
moderate and willing to compromise, but it’s very difficult to improve
in post-conflict countries. Also extensive guarantees offered to the
parties of the conflict take away any incentives to compromise.
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